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A Rational Allocation of Responsibility Between Corporate and Securities Laws

Executive Summary
Corporate and securities laws have different policy goals, jurisdictional reach and
enforcement mechanisms. On the basis of these differences, several guiding principles
can be used to support a rational allocation of responsibility between corporate and
securities laws in Canada. These include:
•

Shareholder versus Investor: Does the subject matter and relevant regulation
focus on shareholders evaluating management or investors buying or selling
securities? Subject areas that focus on the former are more appropriately within
the jurisdiction of corporate law while subject areas that focus on the latter are
more appropriately within the jurisdiction of securities laws.

•

Substance versus Disclosure: Does the regulation of the subject matter impose
substantive rules or does it mandate disclosure of information? If the regulation
imposes substantive requirements requiring parties to take particular actions or
achieve certain results, it is more appropriately within the domain of corporate
law. However, if the regulation mandates disclosure of information, it is within
the historic scope of securities law.

•

Distributing versus Non-Distributing Corporation: Does the regulation focus
exclusively on distributing corporations or both distributing and non-distributing
corporations? While securities laws regulate only distributing corporations,
corporate law regulates both distributing and non-distributing corporations. In
respect of certain areas, it may be appropriate for corporate law to regulate only
non-distributing corporations while leaving the regulation of distributing
corporations to securities laws.

•

Public versus Private Enforcement: Is the activity better enforced through private
litigation and the courts or a public, specialized enforcement body? The CBCA is
more appropriate if the activity is better enforced through private means, whereas
provincial securities laws are more appropriate if the activity is better enforced
through public means.

•

Constitutional Limits: Do the application of the provincial securities laws focus
on the internal governance of CBCA corporations, effectively sterilizing federally
incorporated companies? If so, there may be constitutional restrictions on the
ability of provincial securities laws to regulate in those areas in respect of CBCA
corporations.

The existing model of overlapping regulatory jurisdiction between the CBCA and
provincial securities laws provides some benefits but also imposes significant costs on
stakeholders. The stakeholders that are considered in the analysis are: corporations
(domestic, emerging companies, and those inter-listed in the U.S.); investors
(institutional, retail and foreign); and regulators (federal corporate, provincial corporate
and provincial securities regulators). The benefits of the current system include mutual
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reinforcement and consistency. However, the benefits of the current system are
outweighed by its many costs, which include:
•
•
•
•
•

the costs of duplication incurred by regulators;
costs of compliance imposed on corporations;
time delays and opportunity costs incurred by corporations;
the regulatory burden on emerging companies; and
unequal opportunities, uncertainty and unfairness for investors.

Alternatives to the current regulatory model would preserve the mandate and policy goals
of corporate and securities laws while significantly reducing the costs to stakeholders.
These alternatives include: (a) a joint single national regulator of corporate and securities
laws; (b) the current system of corporate law and a single national securities regulator; (c)
a single national corporate law regulator and the current system of securities laws; and (d)
better co-operation, co-ordination and harmonization within the current regulatory model
of corporate and securities laws.
While each of these alternatives would better serve the public interest than the existing
model, the report focuses on the last alternative presented, given the challenges inherent
in implementing more fundamental reform. Greater co-operation, co-ordination and
harmonization between corporate and securities laws regulators could be achieved
through various mechanisms including the following:
•

A joint committee of corporate and securities law administrators, which could use
the guiding principles highlighted above to determine whether either regulator
should exclusively regulate a particular subject matter; alternatively, where
concurrent jurisdiction is desirable or necessary, the committee would decide how
best to harmonize rules so that the cost to stakeholders is minimized.

•

Incorporation by reference to the other regulatory framework, which would
reduce costs to stakeholders. Exemptions or recognition based on compliance
with the other regulatory framework would also achieve the same purpose.

•

The form of legal instrument used (the act versus regulations versus policy
statements) will affect the ease of amendments and the continued harmonization
of corporate and securities law rules.

Subject areas where corporate and securities laws currently exercise concurrent
jurisdiction and have conflicting or overlapping rules include: insider trading, corporate
governance, takeovers, proxy solicitations and exemptions, and proportionate liability.
On the basis of the guiding principles highlighted above, this report concludes that:
•

Insider trading is more appropriately regulated within the jurisdiction of securities
laws as opposed to corporate law; alternatively, corporate law could continue to
regulate insider trading in respect of non-distributing corporations while leaving
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•

•

the regulation of insider trading in respect of distributing corporations to
securities laws.
Corporate governance, defensive measures in response to takeovers, proxy
solicitations and exemptions, and communication with beneficial shareholders are
more appropriately regulated within the jurisdiction of corporate law as opposed
to securities laws; and
There is little justification for differing proportionate liability schemes in the
CBCA and provincial securities laws.

To the extent that exclusive jurisdiction cannot be achieved, this report recommends that
the provisions for each subject matter highlighted above be harmonized by ensuring that
the relevant rules in each regulatory framework are identical or similar. The least cost
would be imposed on stakeholders if one regulatory framework incorporated the relevant
rule by reference to the other regulatory framework, or created recognized compliance
with the rules of the other regulatory framework as compliance with its own regulatory
framework. Consideration should also be given to the form of legal instrument to allow
for ease of amendments and continued harmonization.
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1. Introduction
The objectives of this research study are four fold.
First, it sets out and analyzes theoretical and policy differences in corporate and securities
laws in Canada. Second, it develops a set of principles that rationalize whether certain
corporate activity should be regulated exclusively within a federal corporate law code or
provincial securities laws. Third, it develops a set of mechanisms that would allow for
harmonization of corporate and securities laws in areas where concurrent jurisdiction is
desirable or necessary. Fourth, it applies those principles to particular areas of corporate
activity, including: insider trading, corporate governance, takeover bids, proxy
solicitations and exemptions, and proportionate liability.
Part 2 sets out the existing corporate and securities law framework within which
businesses in Canada must operate. This part reviews the creation and development of
Canadian corporate law through the CBCA and provincial corporate law statutes, and
compares it against the creation and development of provincial securities laws in Canada.
They are compared on the basis of their differing policy goals and objectives,
jurisdictional reach (including conflicts of laws and constitutional restraints) and
enforcement mechanisms. On the basis of these differences, Part 2 concludes by offering
several guiding principles that should be used to determine whether a particular aspect of
business conduct should be exclusively regulated within in a federal corporate law code
or by provincial securities laws.
Part 3 analyzes the rationales, benefits and costs of the current overlapping regulatory
structure of corporate and securities laws in Canada today. The relevant stakeholders for
this analysis are: corporations (domestic, emerging companies, and those inter-listed in
the U.S.), investors (institutional, retail and foreign), and regulators (federal corporate,
provincial corporate and provincial securities regulators). Part 3 then assesses the
benefits of the current overlapping regulatory structure to the stakeholders including:
mutual reinforcement and consistency. It then assesses the direct and indirect costs of the
current system that are imposed on stakeholders including: costs of duplication incurred
by regulators, costs of compliance imposed on corporations, time delays and opportunity
costs, the regulatory burden on emerging companies, and unequal opportunities,
uncertainty and unfairness for investors. Part 3 concludes with an assessment of whether
a regulatory model other than the existing system would better serve the public interest.
Part 3 analyzes how the current regulatory model could be improved, particularly by
enhancing the existing levels of regulatory co-operation, co-ordination and harmonization
between federal corporate and provincial law regulators in areas where concurrent
jurisdiction is desirable or necessary.
Finally, Part 4 critically analyses the extent of overlap and/or conflict between provisions
in the CBCA and provincial securities laws. These substantive areas that are analyzed are:
corporate governance, insider trading, takeover bids, proxy solicitation rules and
exemptions, communication with beneficial shareholders, and proportionate liability. Part
4 applies the guiding principles developed in Parts 2 to surface whether the CBCA or
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provincial securities laws should be the exclusive or primary regulatory authority in
respect of these areas. Part 4 then applies the mechanisms discussed in Part 3 to enhance
the existing levels of co-operation, co-ordination and harmonization in areas where
exclusive jurisdiction is not possible.
Part 5 concludes.
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2. Theoretical and Policy Differences between Corporate and Securities Laws
In 1971, the Dickerson Committee reported:1
There has been far too much attention paid in the past to
the supposed differences between corporate legislation
and securities legislation. We do not believe that there is
a valid distinction, and that a good deal of what is found
in provincial securities legislation could just as validly be
enacted as corporate legislation.
In a similar vein, the Final Report of the Ontario Task Force on Securities Regulation
stated in 1994:2
We observe that the boundaries between securities and
corporate law are often blurred, and, at both a normative
and pragmatic level, are difficult to draw with
confidence. We note that, at one time, the rules governing
insider trading and shareholder communications were
matters relegated exclusively to corporate law. Few
would now question the suitability of measured
intervention in these areas by securities regulators.
The Dickerson Committee Report and the Final Report of the Task Force on Securities
Regulation make extremely important comments about the appropriate divide between
corporate and securities law. The author of this report is of the view that there are several
guiding principles that can be used to support different responsibilities for corporate and
securities laws. In determining whether there is a rational basis for allocating
responsibility between corporate and securities laws, we must compare the differing
1

Information Canada, Proposal for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, Robert W.V. Dickerson
et al (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at 5. [“Dickerson Report”].
2
Responsibility and Responsiveness – Final Report of the Ontario Task Force on Securities Regulation
(1994), 17 OSCB 3208, page 22 of 95. The Task Force Report also noted that some commentators
expressed criticism of OSC Policy 9.1, particularly in respect of the rules governing related party
transactions, an encroaching on the domain of corporate law. In this regard, the Report stated:
These commentators expressed general concern about the utility of
invoking securities regulation techniques to address matters within the
sphere of corporate governance, which, it was claimed, should be
remitted exclusively to the province of courts and corporate law….In
this area, we recommend the statutory adoption of rule-making power
which would provide clear support for all aspects of OSC Policy 9.1
but for the provisions governing related party transactions. We
characterize the provision providing authorization for related party
transactions as controversial, and anticipate resolution through further
legislative change.
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policy goals, jurisdictional reach and enforcement mechanisms of corporate and
securities laws.
A. Policy Goals
The policy goals of corporate law are to: (a) enhance economic efficiency; (b) ensure
accountability of corporate managers and directors; (c) protect shareholders and other
vulnerable parties; (d) respond to the needs of large, widely-held corporations as well as
small, closely-held businesses; and (e) attract business to the relevant jurisdiction by
inspiring confidence and supporting competitiveness, innovation and growth.3
Corporate law is generally concerned with the internal governance of the corporation and
is primarily focused on the responsibilities, duties and liabilities of directors and mangers
and the rights of shareholders.4
The primary purpose of a corporate law code is enabling.5 It provides a set of default
rules that govern the relationship between the shareholders, directors and managers.
While these stakeholders are free to create their own rules, a corporate law code creates a
set of standard form rules that most parties would themselves have agreed to, had they
put their mind to the matter. In this way, a corporate law code facilitates the efficient
operation of business, reduces transaction costs and enhances economic efficiency.
While most rules in a corporate law code are default provisions, a corporate law code also
contains certain mandatory rules that govern that relationship between the relevant
stakeholders. A limited number of mandatory rules in a corporate law code are necessary
because: (a) failures in the market and lack of voluntary compliance may necessitate
mandatory legal regulation to achieve economic efficiency; and (b) mandatory legal
regulation may be necessary to protect shareholders and other vulnerable parties.6
Because corporate law codes have to be sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of closely
held corporations as well as publicly-held corporations, they have to provide various optout features for closely held corporations where the cost of the mandatory regulation
outweighs the benefit to stakeholders.7

3

For a more detailed discussion and analysis of the policy objectives of corporate law, see Poonam Puri,
The Hallmarks of Good Corporate Law: A Performance Evaluation of the Canada Business Corporations
Act, prepared for Corporations Canada, Industry Canada, 2004. [“Puri, Hallmarks”]
4
While the main focus of a corporate law code is the relationship between shareholders, directors and
managers, corporate law statutes do contain a limited number of provisions that protect the rights of
creditors and other stakeholders. For example, section 42 of the CBCA protects shareholders in the context
of directors declaring dividends. Similarly, section 119 of the CBCA imposes personal liability on directors
for employees’ unpaid wages.
5
For a more detailed discussion of a corporate law code’s enabling features, see Puri, Hallmarks, supra
note 3.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
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Securities laws are concerned with protecting investors and fostering fair and efficient
capital markets. Prior to 1994, the stated mandate of the Ontario Securities Commission8
was investor protection. In 1994, the Securities Act, Ontario was amended and it now
states that its purposes are:9
(a) to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices;
and
(b) to foster fair and efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets.
Securities laws achieve these objectives by regulating corporations that issue their
securities to the public. They mandate disclosure of material information to the market.
Securities laws do not generally impose substantive requirements or dictate outcomes,
such as the price at which an issuer should sell its securities. Securities laws also license
and regulate market participants such as brokers, dealers and underwriters that assist
issuers in accessing the public capital market.
Securities law regulators are increasingly cognizant of the fact that the cost of compliance
with securities laws should not exceed the expected benefit to shareholders, and we are
increasingly witnessing securities commissions around the world engaging in formal
cost-benefit analyses prior to implementation of new laws or rules.10
An expansive interpretation of the securities law mandates of “investor protection” and
“fostering fair and efficient markets” could allow for much of what is regulated under
corporate law to be regulated under securities laws. However, several tests can be used to
support a reasonable and rational allocation of responsibilities.
One test that can be articulated about the difference between corporate and securities law
is that corporate law is focused on shareholders while securities laws are focused on
investors. The concept of investor that is central to securities law is certainly broader than
the concept of shareholder that is central to corporate law. Investor encompasses more
than an existing shareholder in a particular corporation: it includes future shareholders,
debt investors and the market or the investing public generally.
On this basis, it may be useful to draw another broad generalization: a shareholder for
corporate law purposes encompasses an existing shareholder in a particular corporation
who is interested in evaluating the current management, hence the role of corporate law
to focus on the governance of the corporation. In contrast, an investor for securities law
purposes is interested in buying and selling securities, hence the role of securities laws in
ensuring a fair and efficient market for buying and selling.

8

“OSC”
Securities Act, Ontario, section 1.1. [“OSA”]
10
See for example, P.Puri & A.Sen, A Cost Benefit Analysis of the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System,
prepared for the OSC (2003). Available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/HotTopics/currentinfo/prom_inv_conf/pic_20030627_cba-disclosuresystem.pdf.
9
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At some point, the distinction between shareholder and investor breaks down. However,
the Supreme Court of Canada employed a similar distinction in Hercules Managements
Ltd. v. Ernst & Young11 where it held that the shareholders of a corporation could use the
audited financial statements required by the corporate law statute only for the purpose of
evaluating the performance of management, not for the purpose of making additional
investments in the corporation.
In addition, it may be useful to distinguish between corporate and securities laws on the
basis that corporate law provides for mandatory or default rules that impose substantive
requirements on parties while securities laws mandate disclosure of material information.
Once again, it is acknowledged that, at some level, the distinction between substance and
disclosure gets blurred in that mandating disclosure of information can often lead to
preferred substantive results.
Finally, it goes without saying that securities laws regulate companies that distribute their
securities to the public while corporate law generally provides rules for both distributing
and non-distributing corporations.
B. Jurisdictional Reach
The jurisdictional reach of corporate and securities laws also differ, in respect of conflict
of laws rules and constitutional limitations.
i.

Conflict of Laws

A corporation is subject to the corporate law statute under which it chooses to
incorporate. In contrast, a corporation must comply with the securities laws of all the
jurisdictions in which a significant number of its investors reside. As such, a corporation
can only be subject to one corporate law statute but it can be subject to multiple securities
law statutes.
The on-going debate in Canada on a national securities commission reflects concerns
about the inefficiencies and costs associated with the existing securities regulatory
structure with multiple securities regulators.12 This issue does not arise in the context of
the multiple corporate law codes in Canada, because lack of uniformity does not
significantly increase the direct costs imposed to corporations to comply with the
corporate law of their incorporation.
In fact, the conflict of laws rules for corporate law create a framework where jurisdictions
can potentially compete for corporate charters. In the U.S., Delaware has taken the lead
on the incorporation business by providing a responsive corporate law code that is
interpreted by a highly specialized corporate law judiciary. Canada has not experienced

11

[1997] 2 S.C.R. 165.
See It’s Time, Wise Persons Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in Canada,
(Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2003). [“WPC Report”]

12
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the same phenomena;13 the provincial corporate law codes largely mirror the federal
corporate law code. In addition, judges use case law and precedents from one corporate
code to another, and as a result, judicial decisions also assist in harmonizing corporate
law in Canada.
In contrast to the possibility of competition in corporate law, the conflict of laws rules for
securities laws create conditions favourable to convergence of standards.14 We are
currently witnessing a convergence of securities law standards around the world, with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission taking the lead with the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. As a result, we have had an intense debate in Canada about
the appropriate response by Canadian securities regulators as to whether to mirror the
U.S. reforms or create different rules in light of the distinct character of the Canadian
capital markets. The concern from a policy perspective is that we do not want Canadian
corporate and securities law rules and policies to lag too far behind the U.S. and
international standards, given the increasingly global nature of capital, investors and
issuers and the real possibility that certain issuers and investors may bypass Canadian
markets altogether.
ii.

Constitutional Law

Both the federal and provincial governments have authority to make corporate and
securities laws.15
The provinces have authority to make laws in respect of “the
incorporation of companies with provincial objects” under section 92(11) of the
Constitution Act, 1867. The federal government does not have an express power to
incorporate companies; it relies on the peace, order and good government power in s.91
of the Constitution Act, 1867 to do so.16
The provinces regulate securities markets on the basis of their power to regulate property
and civil rights within the province. While the federal government has not promulgated
securities laws, the WPC Report refers to several legal opinions which it obtained to the
effect that it has the authority to do so.17

13

See Daniels, R.J. (1991). “Should the Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law
Market,” McGill Law Journal 36 at 130; See also Cumming, D.J. and J.G. MacIntosh, (2000) The Role of
Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law. International Review of Law and
Economics 20 at 141.
14
See P.Puri & J. Larsen, Corporate Governance and Securities Regulation in the 21st Century (Lexis-Nexis
Butterworths, Toronto: 2004). [“Puri & Larsen, 21st Century”]
15
For a much more detailed analysis of constitutional law issues on this topic, see Peter Hogg,
Constitutional Law in Canada, chapter 23 (Toronto: Carswell, 2003). [“Hogg”]
16
See Citizens’ Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881) 7 App. Cas 96; John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton [1915]
A.C. 330 at 340 suggests that the trade and commerce power may also be a source for the federal
incorporation power, but Peter Hogg argues that this interpretation is incorrect. See Hogg, ibid, at 23-1,
footnote 3.
17
Supra note 12. The WPC obtained legal opinions of Ogilvy Renault, Torys LLP, and Fasken Martineau
DuMoulin LLP, which are contained in Wise Persons Committee to Review the Structure of Securities
Regulation in Canada, Research Studies, (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2003) at 1-76.
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Constitutional law does, however, impose certain restrictions on provincial securities
laws (and provincial laws in general) in regulating the conduct of CBCA companies.18
Professor Peter Hogg states the relevant principle as follows:19
A province may not impair the “status and essential
powers” of a federally-incorporated company…What this
means is that if a province enacts a law which is within its
legislative competence, but which would have the effect of
impairing the status or essential powers of a federal
company, then the law will be held to be inapplicable to
any federal company.
The status and essential powers test was applied in A.-G. Man. V. A.-G. Can.(Manitoba
Securities).20 In this case, Manitoba securities legislation prohibited a company from
issuing securities without first obtaining a licence from the provincial regulator, which
could examine the company’s incorporating documents and financial condition among
other matters. The Privy Council held that the statute was constitutionally invalid in
respect of federally incorporated companies on the basis that the capacity of a company
to raise capital is so essential to its existence and the provincial legislation impairs the
status and essential capacities of the company to a substantial degree. However, in
Lymburn v. Mayland, Alberta’s securities act provisions focused not on the licensing of
companies, but on the licensing of brokers and salespeople who would sell companies’
securities to the public. Formulated as such, the Privy Council held that the provincial
provisions were valid in respect of federally incorporated companies.21
In Multiple Access v. McCutcheon22, a more recent case in which the Supreme Court of
Canada held that Ontario securities law regulating insider trading was applicable to a
federally incorporated company, the relevant test was also articulated as whether the
application of the provincial securities laws to the federal company would “impair the
status and essential capacities of the company in a substantial degree.”23
Justice Estey provided another formulation of the test where he stated that provincial
securities legislation is constitutionally valid where the “central thrust of the legislation is
not the constitution of the corporation.”24 This suggests that provincial securities
legislation would be invalid where the central thrust is the constitution of the
corporation.25 As will be discussed in Part 4, this ratio and line of reasoning is
18

Hogg, supra note 14 at 23-12.
Ibid., at 23-10.
20
[1929] A.C. 260, discussed in Hogg, supra note 18 at 23-11.
21
[1932] A.C. 318. See Hogg, supra note 18, at 23-12.
22
Multiple Access Ltd. v McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161. See also William J. Braithwaite, “Who is best
suited to introduce corporate governance reform and mutual fund reform?” in Securities Regulation: Issues
and Perspectives, Queens Business Law Symposium (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) where he discusses this
issue in detail.
23
Braithwaite, supra note 22.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
19
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particularly significant in the areas of corporate governance, proxy solicitations and
exemptions, and shareholder communications.
C. Enforcement
Enforcement mechanisms for corporate and securities laws also differ. While a corporate
law code relies largely on private parties pursuing their legal rights in the court system,
securities laws are largely enforced by an active, specialized regulatory body.
A corporate law statute is generally self-enforcing. It relies in large part on litigation by
aggrieved shareholders using remedies such as the derivative action and the oppression
action. The CBCA provides that the Director may, for example, commence a derivative
suit or oppression action, but in practice, there has been minimal regulatory intervention
in respect of enforcement of the CBCA by the Director.
In contrast, securities laws are actively enforced by an activist, specialized regulatory
body, although there is some scope for private enforcement by aggrieved investors.26
Canadian securities regulators have broad discretionary power to act in the public interest
in regulating the conduct of issuers and market participants. This public interest power
has been the subject of much criticism.27
This public interest power allows for overreaching by securities regulators into the
corporate law domain for a number of reasons. First, the public interest power in, for
example, section 127 of the OSA has been interpreted such that it does not require a
breach of any particular provision of the Act.28 As well, the public interest power is
considered to be preventive, not remedial. It can be used by securities regulators to
prevent future misconduct. In this regard, the OSC stated In Re Mithras Management
Ltd.: 29
We are not here to punish past conduct; that is the role of
the courts…We are here to restrain, as best we can, future
conduct that is likely to be prejudicial to the public interest
in having capital markets that are both fair and efficient.

26

Statutory civil liability provisions in provincial securities laws create some scope for private enforcement
by aggrieved investors. For example, the OSA creates statutory civil liability for misrepresentations in a
prospectus, (s.130); offering memorandum (s.130.1); takeover bid circular, issuer bid circular or director’s
circular (s.131); liability for non-delivery of prospectus or bid document (s.133); liability for insider trading
(s.134). The OSA also contains a statutory scheme for liability for misrepresentations or omissions in
respect of continuous disclosure obligations.
27
See, for example, J. Macintosh, “Standard Trust co case Signals Expansion of the ‘Public Interest’
Powers of Securities Regulators” (1993), 1 Corporate Financing 38, where Macintosh criticizes the OSC
for overreaching in to the domain of corporate law by focusing its decision on the duty of care of directors.
28
In Re Cable Casting [1978] OSCB 37, the OSC issued a cease trade order even though there was no
violation of securities laws. This was affirmed in Re Canadian Tire Corp. (1987), 35 B.L.R. 56, (1987), 59
O.R. (2d) 79 (Div. Ct.).
29
(1990), 13 OSCB 1600.

13

A Rational Allocation of Responsibility Between Corporate and Securities Laws

In light of the different enforcement mechanisms available to corporate and securities
laws, a rational allocation of responsibility between corporate and securities laws may be
premised on the basis of whether the particular subject matter is best enforced by private
parties and the court system or by a specialized regulatory body through public
enforcement.
In comparing the relative merits of private versus public enforcement, it should be noted
that private enforcement works best when the private parties have the economic
incentives and resources to pursue their legal claims. In an article analysing the policy
choices for controlling corporate misconduct, I noted that rational apathy and lack of
economic incentives may deter private parties from pursuing meritorious legal claims
against corporations and their directors and managers:30
Private enforcement may be insufficient to control
corporate misconduct when those harmed are unable to
detect the harm, when the harm to each individual is
relatively small, or when the individuals do not have the
financial means to bring a private suit.
In addition, damages that are awarded in a private suit represent different policy goals
and objectives than fines that are imposed in the context of public enforcement. Damages
awarded to a private party attempt to compensate for the harm suffered by the plaintiff(s)
whereas a fine set by a public body represents other policy goals such as deterrence.31
The relative institutional competence of the courts compared to a regulatory body must
also be considered. Generally speaking, courts are passive and get involved after harm
has been done whereas securities regulators are able to intervene ex-poste and prevent
future misconduct. Securities regulators are staffed with highly specialized securities
lawyers who have often practiced in the area of corporate-securities transactions. In
contrast, courts are staffed with generalist judges, usually from litigation backgrounds as
opposed to transactional corporate backgrounds. The Commercial List in Toronto is,
however, allowing for the development of an expert, specialized class of judges who are
able to engage in efficient dispute resolution of complex corporate law matters.
D. Guiding Principles to Allocate Responsibility
Based on the preceding analysis, a set of non-exhaustive principles or factors should be
considered in determining whether federal corporate law or provincial securities laws
ought to be the exclusive regulator for any particular subject matter.
•

30
31

Shareholder versus Investor: Does the subject matter and relevant regulation
focus on shareholders evaluating management or investors buying or selling
securities? Subject areas that focus on the former are more appropriately within

Poonam Puri, “Sentencing the Criminal Corporation” 39:2-3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 611 at 613.
Ibid.
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the jurisdiction of corporate law while subject areas that focus on the latter are
more appropriately within the jurisdiction of securities laws.
•

Substance versus Disclosure: Does the regulation of the subject matter impose
substantive rules or does it mandate disclosure of information? If the regulation
imposes substantive requirements requiring parties to take particular actions or
achieve certain results, it is more appropriately within the domain of corporate
law. However, if the regulation mandates disclosure of information, it is within
the historic scope of securities law.

•

Distributing versus Non-Distributing Corporation: Is the relevant rule focused
exclusively on distributing companies or both distributing and non-distributing
companies? Securities laws regulate distributing companies while corporate law
regulates both distributing and non-distributing companies. In respect of some
matters, it may be appropriate for securities laws to regulate distributing
corporations and corporate law to regulate non-distributing corporations, as in the
context of insider trading, discussed below.

•

Public versus Private Enforcement: Is the activity better enforced through private
litigation and the courts or a public, specialized enforcement body? The CBCA is
more appropriate if the activity is better enforced through private means, whereas
provincial securities laws are more appropriate if the activity is better enforced
through public means.

•

Constitutional Limits: Do the application of the provincial securities laws focus
on the internal governance of CBCA corporations, effectively sterilizing federally
incorporated companies? If so, there may be constitutional restrictions on the
ability of provincial securities laws to regulate in those areas in respect of CBCA
corporations.

These principles will be applied to particular subject areas in Part 4 of the Report.
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3. Regulatory Models of Corporate and Securities Laws
A. Existing Model
Part 3 analyzes the rationales, benefits and costs of the current overlapping and
conflicting regulatory structure of corporate and securities laws in Canada today. The
relevant stakeholders for this analysis are: corporations (domestic, emerging companies,
and those inter-listed in the U.S.), investors (institutional, retail and foreign), and
regulators (federal corporate, provincial corporate and provincial securities regulators).
The current system of overlapping regulatory structure provides some benefits. In
particular, it allows for mutual reinforcement and consistency. A rule that is contained in
both the CBCA and provincial securities laws sends a consistent message to the global
corporate and investment community that these issues are important to Canadian
regulators and that both the federal corporate law statute and the provincial securities
laws reinforce each other. Given that Canada has a fragmented securities regulatory
structure, it may also be symbolically important for the CBCA, being the federal
incorporation statute, to contain standards that reflect global regulatory best practices.
The fact that many of the largest Canadian corporations are incorporated under the CBCA
adds weight to this argument.
However, the benefits of the current system are outweighed by its many costs.
Significant costs are imposed on stakeholders by the current overlapping regulatory
structure. These include: the costs of duplication incurred by regulators; costs of
compliance imposed on corporations; time delays and opportunity costs incurred by
corporations; the regulatory burden on emerging companies; and unequal opportunities,
uncertainty and unfairness for investors. Each cost is discussed below in detail.
i.

Costs of Duplication Incurred by Regulators

CBCA administrators, provincial corporate law administrators and provincial securities
commissions each devote significant resources to the substantive areas that they
concurrently regulate. If corporate and securities law regulators could rationally allocate
subject matters, significant cost savings would result.
ii.

Costs of Compliance Imposed on Corporations

From the perspective of any particular corporation, it only needs to comply with one set
of corporate law rules, and so different rules or the lack of complete harmonization of
corporate law codes across Canada does not impose additional transaction costs.
Distributing corporations, however, must comply with not only the corporate law code
under which they are incorporated but the provisions of all securities laws in which they
have investors, which significantly increases their costs of compliance. Currently,
corporate and securities law rules often conflict or differ in areas where they concurrently
regulate. If the relevant corporate and securities laws rules were identical in areas where
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concurrent jurisdiction is exercised, and this was clearly indicated to corporations and
their profession advisors (i.e. by way of incorporation by reference), then the costs of
compliance would be significantly reduced.
iii.

Time Delays and Opportunity Costs Incurred by Corporations

Overlapping and/or conflicting provisions in the CBCA and provincial securities laws add
to the time delays and increase the opportunity costs of public companies.
iv.

Burden on Emerging Companies

In the context of analyzing the costs of compliance for corporate issuers, special attention
should be paid to the regulatory burden imposed on emerging companies. Small and
emerging companies comprise a large portion of the Canadian economy and face a
disproportionately large regulatory burden compared to larger companies, which are
more easily able to absorb the burden of high costs of compliance.
v.

Unequal Opportunities, Uncertainty and Unfairness for
Investors

Conflicting rules in the CBCA and provincial securities laws create unfairness and a
climate of uncertainty for investors who do not precisely know what their legal rights and
duties are. Differing rules in the CBCA and provincial corporate law statutes also create
different rights and opportunities for investors, which can result in an unequal playing
field.
Until the repeal of the CBCA’s takeover bid provisions in 2001, the conflicting provisions
in the CBCA and provincial securities laws added unnecessary costs and created
uncertainty for investors, as illustrated by Nordair Inc. v. Quebecair-Air Quebec Inc.,32
where there was a conflict between the Securities Act (Quebec) and the CBCA on the
timing of the obligation to take-up and pay on withdrawal rights. In this case, Quebecair
made an unsolicited bid for all the commons shares of Nordair, subject to a condition that
the bid would not be taken up and paid for by Quebecair until the Air Transport
Committee established under the National Transportation Act approved the change in
control. A deadline for receipt of approval was set at January 23, 1986, and while this
deadline complied with the Securities Act (Quebec) it contravened sections 188(a) and
190(b) of the CBCA. The conflicting rules resulted in Nordair and its controlling
shareholder applying to have the unsolicited bid declared void, while Quebecair counterapplied pursuant to section 197 to obtain retroactive exemptions from ss.188(a) and
190(b) of the CBCA. The court dismissed the Nordair application but granted retroactive
exemptions to Quebecair under s.197 of the CBCA. The time delay and opportunity costs
to the target and bidder were significant, not to mention the direct monetary costs
ultimately incurred by the target and bidder’s shareholders. (10 lawyers were on record in
the hearing of the case.) Because of the uncertainty surrounding the litigation, the
target’s shareholders, the bidder and competing bidders were “paralysed” from acting or
32

1985 CarswellQue 27; 32 B.L.R. 253, [1986] R.J.Q. 756 Quebec Sup. Ct.
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pursuing other options. As a general matter, the granting of retroactive exemptions also
adds to a climate of uncertainty. From a policy perspective, conflicting rules in corporate
and securities laws in the context of takeovers create a disincentive for initial and
competing bidders to pursue unsolicited take-overs, resulting in sub-optimal levels of
take-over bid activity, which is considered to be an important corporate governance
mechanism to ensure accountability of management.
Similarly, an unequal playing field is created for investors across the country by the
differing requirements in corporate and securities laws in respect of proxy solicitations
and exemptions. An investor who wishes to communicate with other shareholders may be
in compliance with the CBCA may be in violation of provincial securities laws. In
addition, an investor may have broader and more substantial rights of communication
with other shareholders if the company in which he or she is invested is incorporated
under the CBCA as compared to a provincial corporate law statute.
B. Alternative Models
As noted above, the benefits of the current system are outweighed by the costs it imposes
on stakeholders. There are a number of ways in which the current regulatory structure
could be redesigned. Alternatives to the current regulatory system would preserve and
could, in fact, enhance the mandate and policy goals of both corporate and securities laws
while significantly reducing the costs to stakeholders.
These alternatives include: (i) a joint single national regulator of corporate and securities
laws; (ii) the current system of corporate law and a single national regulator; (iii) a single
national corporate law regulator and the current system of securities laws; and (iv) better
co-operation, co-ordination and harmonization within the current regulatory model of
corporate and securities laws. While each of these alternatives would better serve the
public interest than the existing model, the report focuses on the last alternative
presented, given the challenges inherent in implementing more fundamental reform.
i.

A single national regulator of corporate and securities laws

If Canada’s regulatory system of corporate and securities laws was housed under a single
regulatory body, there would be significant cost savings to stakeholders. The costs of
duplication that regulators currently incur could be significantly reduced as the expertise
that is housed throughout corporate law regulators and provincial securities regulators
across the country could be consolidated. The costs of compliance, time delays and
opportunity costs and the burden on emerging companies would also be reduced because
issues about jurisdiction and authority could be resolved internally and one clear set of
consistent rules would emerge from this joint body. As a result, investors would also be
more certain of their legal rights. The concept of a national single regulator of securities
laws has been hotly debate in Canada and one could expect additional challenges facing
the creation of a joint national corporate-securities law regulator.
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ii.

A single national regulator of securities laws and the current
system of corporate law

A regulatory model where securities laws are regulated by a single national regulator, as
recently recommended by the WPC Report, combined with the current system of
corporate law could reduce the costs to stakeholders. Costs of duplication incurred by
regulators could be reduced, as it would allow for easier co-ordination and harmonization
of the CBCA with securities laws. To the extent that this model will allow for easier
allocation of responsibility between corporate and securities laws or easier
harmonization, the costs to corporations in respect of compliance and investors could also
be reduced significantly.
iii.

A single national corporate law regulator and current
securities system

Another regulatory alternative would be to retain the current securities law system and
create a single corporate law regulator. This alternative would not reduce the costs as
significantly as the earlier two alternatives because harmonization or uniformity among
corporate law regulators, while desirable, does not currently impose significant costs on
corporations or investors. It may make it marginally easier for one corporate law body to
co-ordinate and harmonize corporate and securities laws with the Canadian Securities
Administrators.33
iv.

Improvements to the existing model

The current model of concurrent jurisdiction of corporate and securities laws could be
improved at the margin, resulting in some cost savings to stakeholders. Greater cooperation, co-ordination and harmonization between corporate and securities laws
regulators would be beneficial. It could be could be achieved through various
mechanisms including: (a) A joint committee of corporate and securities law
administrators; (b) Incorporation by reference to the other regulatory framework; (c)
Exemptions or recognition of the other regulatory framework; and (d) Forms of legal
instruments used to allow for ease of amendments and continued harmonization.
(a) Joint Committee of Corporate and Securities Law
Administrators.
While the CSA co-ordinates and harmonizes policies and practices of provincial
securities regulators, there does not appear to be a parallel co-ordinating body for
corporate and securities law regulators, or even federal and provincial corporate law
regulators.
A joint committee of corporate and securities law regulators should be established which
would have a mandate of achieving some level of rational and reasonable allocation of
responsibility between corporate and securities laws in Canada. The committee would
33

“CSA”.
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meet regularly to discuss which regulatory body should have exclusive authority to
regulate a relevant subject matter, and the guiding principles set out in Part 2 of this
report could be used as a starting point for the discussion and debate.
Where the committee cannot achieve consensus in respect of exclusive jurisdiction, the
committee should consider adopting mechanisms, including those discussed below, so
that concurrent regulatory jurisdiction minimizes the costs to imposed on stakeholders.
The committee could potentially counter-act the tendency in the recent past where
provincial securities laws have expanded and encroached into areas that have
traditionally been the focus of corporate law. While provincial securities commissions
can act more quickly given their rule-making power and other features, a joint committee
such as the one proposed would require a reasoned and balanced approach to expanding
in areas which would better be regulated through corporate law. The existence of the
committee would also reduce the likelihood of regulatory first-mover advantage where
the regulator who first enters the field can significantly constrain the regulatory options
of the second regulator.
(b) Incorporation by Reference
Another method of achieving harmonization is for one regulatory framework to
incorporate the rules of the other regulatory framework in respect of the relevant subject
matter.
Incorporation by reference would reduce the costs of compliance to corporations and
investors because they would be able to clearly tell that there is one clear, consistent rule
in both corporate and securities laws. It is unclear whether it would reduce the costs of
duplication incurred by multiple regulators, because presumably the regulator that is
incorporating by reference would engage in a full analysis and review of the appropriate
form and content of the required regulation before deciding that incorporation by
reference to the other regulator’s rules is the preferred course of action.
In a recently released discussion paper, Industry Canada has requested comments on
incorporating by reference a number of the CSA’s rules on corporate governance into the
CBCA and CBCA regulations.34 Incorporation by reference forces one to ask the question
of why a rule is necessary in both the CBCA and provincial securities laws in the first
place. The answer depends on the weight given to the benefits of mutual reinforcement
and consistency, and the symbolic aspect of the CBCA concurrently regulating in the
area, even if by incorporation by reference.
The form that incorporation by reference takes may affect level of regulatory autonomy
of the relevant regulator and the costs imposed on stakeholders. There are several
options including: (a) copying the contents of the rule into the CBCA or the CBCA
regulations; and (b) referring to the provincial securities law rule in the CBCA or CBCA
34

Industry Canada, Towards An Improved Standard of Corporate Governance for Federally Incorporated
Companies: Proposals for Amendments to The Canada Business Corporations Act (May, 2004).
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regulations. If the actual rule is copied into the CBCA or regulations, then an amendment
to the CBCA will also be required if the provincial securities regulators change their rule.
There will likely be a lag in the amendments and this may impose unnecessary costs on
stakeholders. If the securities law rule is simply referred to in the CBCA or regulations,
then a change in the securities law rule would not require a change to the corporate code.
When a securities law rule is changed, corporate law regulators would, of course, have
the authority to re-evaluate whether they should continue to incorporate by reference, but
the process would be smoother and would impose fewer additional costs on corporations
and investors.
(c) Recognition or Exemptions
Another mechanism for harmonization between corporate and securities laws is to allow
for recognition of the rules of the other regulator, such that a corporation that complies
with the laws of one regulatory framework would be deemed to have complied with the
other regulatory framework. The recognition could be one way or mutual, and it could be
discretionary or generally available.
The MJDS agreement between Canadian and U.S. securities law regulators operates on
the basis of mutual recognition.35 Recent corporate governance reform by Canadian
securities regulators exempts public companies that are inter-listed in the U.S. from the
new Canadian requirements, on the basis that they are currently complying with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related provisions.36 In addition, provincial securities
laws contain exemptions for issuers if they are in compliance with their statute of
incorporation.37
General exemptions or general recognition as opposed to discretionary exemptions or
recognition impose fewer costs on stakeholder, but from a policy perspective
consideration should also be given to the regulators’ level of confidence that private
parties will be able to police themselves.
(d) Forms of Legal Instruments Used
Related to the discussion in the preceding section, corporate and securities law regulators
should make an effort to ensure that the forms of legal instruments used to bring a rule
into effect allow for ease of continued harmonization in the future. For example, a
corporate or securities law act, which is the most difficult to change, should contain rules
that represent broad principles, while particular aspects of a rule, such as the number of
days, number of directors, and any other detailed information should be contained in a
regulation, rule or policy statement that can be more easily changed. That way, regulators
can respond quickly to changed market conditions and more easily “keep up” with the
other regulator if it changes its rules.
35

See Puri & Sen, Cost-Benefit Analysis of the MJDS, supra note 10.
See generally, Leslie McCallum & Poonam Puri, Canadian Companies Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(Toronto: Lexis-Nexis/Butterworths, 2004).
37
See for example, Section 81 of the OSA, discussed infra, Part 4: Proxy Solicitations and Exemptions.
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Industry Canada’s recently released discussion paper proposes to put many of the details
of its corporate governance initiatives into the CBCA regulations.38 This is an important
feature of the proposed reforms, the significance of which should not be overlooked.
Putting details in the regulations will allow CBCA administrators to respond more easily
and harmonize more quickly if securities regulators change their rules in the area in the
future.

38

Industry Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 34.
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4. Application to Areas of Concurrent Jurisdiction
Part 4 critically analyses the extent of overlap and/or conflict between provisions in the
CBCA with provincial securities laws. The substantive topics that are discussed are:
corporate governance, insider trading, takeover bids, proxy solicitation rules and
exemptions, communication with beneficial shareholders, and proportionate liability.
Part 4 then applies the principles developed in Part 2 to explore whether the CBCA or
provincial securities laws should be the exclusive or primary regulatory authority for each
of these areas. Where exclusive regulatory oversight is not possible or where concurrent
regulatory oversight is desirable, Part 4 then explores the issue of how best to minimize
the costs to stakeholders in complying with multiple regulatory requirements, based on
the discussion in Part 3.
A. Insider Trading
i.

Current Situation

Both the CBCA and provincial securities laws currently regulate insider trading.
Provincial securities laws regulate insider trading of securities of reporting issuers, while
the CBCA regulates insider trading for distributing and non-distributing corporations. In
addition, federal Bill C-13: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Capital Markets Fraud
and Evidence-Gathering) also proposes to create a new Criminal Code offence of
improper insider trading.
Until the 2001 amendments to the CBCA, the CBCA required insiders to file periodic
trading reports with the Director39 who had an obligation to publish such reports.40 These
provisions were repealed on the basis that the CBCA requirements were duplicative with
provincial securities laws, which contained similar requirements.
The CBCA and provincial securities laws both continue to prohibit trading of securities
by insiders with knowledge of material non-public information. However, each
regulatory framework words the relevant provisions slightly differently. For example, the
CBCA regulates “insiders” as defined in the CBCA while the OSA focuses on persons or
companies in a “special relationship” with a reporting issuer as defined in the Act.41
In addition, the enforcement provisions of the CBCA and provincial securities laws differ.
Both regulatory frameworks contemplate public enforcement by way of fines and/or
imprisonment and private enforcement by way of statutory civil liability. A person who
violates the insider trading provisions of the CBCA is currently liable to imprisonment of
up to 6 months and/or a fine which is not to exceed the greater of $1 million or three
times the profit made (this was increased from $5000 in Bill S-11). However, under the
39

Section 127 of the CBCA, since repealed.
Section 129 of the CBCA, since repealed.
41
Section 76(5) of the OSA.
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OSA, a person who engages in insider trading is potentially subject to a much longer
imprisonment term and significantly greater fine.
ii.

Analysis

The first step in the analysis is to analyze whether either corporate or securities law
should exclusively regulate insider trading.
Applying the shareholder versus investor test, insider trading appears to be primarily
focused on maintaining a fair public market for securities such that insiders trade on the
basis of the same information as other buyers and sellers in the market. Insider trading is
more concerned with investors and the market as a whole rather than any particular
shareholder in any particular corporation. This analysis suggests that insider trading is
more appropriately within the domain of securities law as opposed to corporate law.
However, the federal criminal law power can and should be used to address the most
egregious cases of capital markets fraud, including insider trading.42
Applying the substance versus disclosure test, insider trading regulation takes the form of
periodic reporting requirements and a prohibition on trading in certain circumstances.
The periodic reporting requirement is disclosure based; it is appropriately within the
jurisdiction of provincial securities laws and the CBCA appropriately withdrew from the
requirement in 2001. The prohibition on trading, on its surface, is a substantive
requirement; however, a better interpretation of it is to view it as a requirement that all
material information must be disclosed to the market before insiders can trade. On this
basis, insider trading prohibitions fit within the traditional form of securities law as
opposed to corporate law.
Applying the status and essential powers test, insider trading prohibitions contained in
provincial securities laws do not sterilize the operation of federally incorporated
companies; nor do not they affect the central constitution or governance of the company.
One cannot reasonably make the case that provincial insider trading laws should not
apply to CBCA incorporated companies on the basis of constitutional law.
Are insider trading laws best enforced by public means or private means? Optimal
enforcement of insider trading through private means is highly unlikely for a number of
reasons. Most investors that are on the opposite end of a transaction involving prohibited
insider trading are unaware that they have been harmed. As well, the process of matching
buyers with sellers in a public secondary market is more or less random and so the
justification for damages to any particular buyer or seller is diminished. These factors
suggest that statutory civil liability is likely not very effective in the context of insider
trading and that public enforcement is necessary to control misconduct in this area.
In respect of public enforcement, who is the most appropriate regulator? Public
enforcement by way of the CBCA Director is least appropriate and least likely to be
42
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effective, given the self-enforcing nature of corporate law and the generally passive role
of the Director. Both the provincial securities commissions and the federal government,
through its criminal law jurisdiction, can effectively regulate this area.
Securities regulators have placed increased emphasis on insider trading recently.43 The
federal government is also committed to expanding the resources devoted to investigating
and prosecuting serious cases of capital markets fraud including insider trading. It has
recently established Integrated Market Enforcement Teams (IMETs) across Canada
comprised of RCMP investigators, forensic accountants and lawyers in key financial
centres across the country. In addition, Bill C-13 creates, inter alia, a new Criminal Code
offence of improper insider trading, as noted above. Under Bill C-13, the Attorney
General of Canada would exercise concurrent jurisdiction, with the provinces to
prosecute certain fraud-related offences in the Criminal Code.
This leads us to the second stage of analysis which focuses on the mechanisms that are
appropriate to minimize costs on stakeholders if concurrent jurisdiction is appropriate or
maintained. As discussed in Part 3 of this report, the relevant regulators need to cooperate, co-ordinate and harmonize their rules, policies and practices on insider trading.
In respect of penalties, the maximum mandatory sentences in the CBCA and provincial
securities laws should be harmonized. While the reality is that judges and regulators do
not impose sentence anywhere close to the maximum mandatory sentences set out in
legislation, the significant disparity in mandatory maximum sentences between the CBCA
and the provincial securities laws creates a situation of unfairness and uncertainty for
investors and insiders which should be addressed.44 In this regard, Industry Canada’s
recently released discussion paper on amendments to the CBCA proposes to increase the
penalty for insider trading offence to mirror the penalties under the Ontario, Quebec and
Alberta securities laws.45
In respect of the offence of insider trading that is contained in both the CBCA and
provincial securities laws, further effort should be made to harmonize the two sets of
provisions. For example, the CBCA refers to “confidential” information while the OSA
refers to material non-public information. However, a better approach may be to allow
the CBCA to exclusively regulate insider trading in respect of non-distributing
corporations, while the provincial securities legislation could continue to focus on a
statutory civil liability scheme for public companies.
In respect of concurrent jurisdiction of federal criminal law with provincial securities
laws over insider trading, it is not necessary to harmonize the offence provisions because
a criminal offence can and should have higher thresholds than regulatory or
43

The Illegal Insider Trading Task Force released an independent report in November 2003, which was
tabled to the CSA, with recommendations on how best to prevent, detect and deter illegal insider trading in
Canada. Available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/HotTopics/currentinfo/intr_20031112_taskforce-report.htm.
44
See Puri, Sentencing the Criminal Corporation, supra note 30.
45
Supra note 34, at page 18.

25

A Rational Allocation of Responsibility Between Corporate and Securities Laws

administrative offences (including an intent requirement). However, the relevant
regulators do need to work together to have a co-ordinated approach to determine which
cases get sent where. In this regard, the Department of Justice has stated:46
Federal involvement would be limited to a narrow range
of cases that threaten the national interest in the integrity
of capital markets… In order to ensure proper
coordination, the Government of Canada will work with
the provinces to establish prosecution protocols that would
ensure a coordinated and effective implementation of
concurrent jurisdiction.
In the context of concurrent federal and provincial jurisdiction, the most egregious insider
trading cases could be prosecuted under the Criminal Code with greater stigma and
harsher penalties, while less serious cases could be dealt with under the regulatory or
administrative process of provincial securities commissions.
B. Corporate Governance
Until recently, stock exchanges played a central role in corporate governance. For
example, following the Dey Report entitled “Where were the Directors?” the TSX
adopted a list of 14 corporate governance guidelines in 1995 and required listed
companies to disclose how their practices compared against the industry best practises.47
As a response to recent corporate governance and financial disclosure improprieties,
provincial securities regulators have proposed to take over the regulation of corporate
governance matters of public companies. Provincial securities regulators (with British
Columbia and Quebec abstaining) have released a proposed policy statement containing
18 corporate governance guidelines (that in large part mirror the TSX’s guidelines) and a
proposed rule that would mandate disclosure of a company’s practices compared to the
recommendations.48
i.

Composition of the Board, Nominating Committee, and
Compensation Committee

The CBCA currently contains certain minimum standards in respect of corporate
governance. For example, the CBCA currently requires that directors be over the age of

46

Department of Justice, Backgrounder, Federal Strategy to Deter Serious Capital Markets Fraud, available
at http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2003/doc_30928.html.
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proposed Multilateral Policy 58-201, Effective Corporate Governance. However, the securities regulators
of Alberta, B.C. and Quebec have more recently proposed another rule that would mandate companies to
disclose their corporate governance practices but without providing a recommended best practice. See
proposed Multilateral Instrument 51-104, Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices
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18, of sound mind, individuals, and not have the status of bankrupt.49 In respect of the
size and composition of the board, the CBCA requires that distributing corporations have
a minimum of three directors, two of whom must not be employees or officers of the
corporation or its affiliates.50
Industry Canada has proposed to amend the CBCA to require the board of distributing
corporations to: (i) be comprised of a majority of independent directors; and (ii) have a
chair of the board who is separate from the CEO of the corporation or alternatively to
have a lead independent director.51 The main proposed provincial securities law rule
recommends that companies do so but requires them to disclose their practice.
Industry Canada has also proposed to amend the CBCA to require the striking of
compensation and nominating committees which must be comprised of independent
directors. The proposed provincial securities law rule recommends that they do so and
requires that they disclose their practice.
ii.

Audit Committee Composition and Responsibilities

In respect of the size and composition of the audit committee, the CBCA currently
requires that audit committee consist of 3 directors, a majority of whom are not officers
or employees of the corporation or its affiliates.52 The Industry Canada discussion paper
on corporate governance has recommended that the entire audit committee be comprised
of independent directors. The CSA’s Audit Committee Rule contains the same
requirement subject to a number of exceptions.
Currently, under CBCA, the theory is that shareholders appoint auditors and auditors
report to shareholders.53 The CBCA currently precludes the audit committee from
making a recommendation directly to shareholders in respect of the appointment of the
auditor, but Industry Canada proposes to amend the CBCA so that the audit committee
recommends the auditor to the board who then submits the auditor for approval to the
shareholders.54 It is also proposed that the CBCA would be amended so that it would
required that the audit committee have a written mandate, that it would be allowed to
engage independent counsel and fund advisors. In addition, it is proposed that the CBCA
regulations would require disclosure in the management proxy circular of other pertinent
information. The CSA Audit Committee Rule also addresses this substantive area.
iii.

Auditor Oversight and Independence

49
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The recently created Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) is a joint initiative of
the CSA, the Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions and the Canadian Institute
of Chartered Accountants. It is responsible for ensuring that firms that audit public
companies meet high standards of independence, accountability and transparency. The
Industry Canada discussion paper proposes to amend the definition of auditor in the
CBCA to require that auditors of distributing corporations be a participating firm in
CPAB.55 It also proposes to amend the CBCA regulations to require disclosure in the
management proxy circular of any non-audit services engaged in by the auditor and
amounts paid for auditing and non-auditing services. These proposed amendments to the
CBCA are similar to the CSA’s National Instrument 52-108 – Auditor Oversight.
iv.

Certification of Financial Statements

The CSA has recently adopted a rule requiring CEO/CFO certification of financial
statements. The Industry Canada paper proposes to amend the CBCA to require
CEO/CFO certification of financial statements.56 It is proposed that the requirement to
certify would be in the statute, but that the actual form and content of the certification
would be contained in the regulations, which could be adopted through various means.
v.

Analysis

The first step in the analysis is to analyze whether either corporate or securities law
should exclusively regulate corporate governance.
Applying the shareholder versus investor test, corporate governance is focused on the
role and responsibilities of the board of directors and management and their relationship
to shareholders. It is primarily focused on shareholders as opposed to investors. At some
point, one can make the case that bad corporate governance practices across many
corporations will have a detrimental impact on investor confidence in the market, but at
its core, corporate governance is a corporate law issue in that is focused on existing
shareholders of corporations who are attempting to meaningfully ensure accountability of
management and evaluate their performance.
Applying the substance versus disclosure test, it is important to note the multiple ways in
which securities regulators have expanded into the realm of corporate governance. The
proposed corporate governance guidelines that provincial securities regulators are
seeking comment on would take the form of mandatory disclosure, which is consistent
with the traditional form of securities law, (although one could make the argument that
mandating disclosure of how a company compares against recommended best practices
effectively imposes substantive requirements). The CSA’s audit committee rule,
however, is a mandatory rule that reaches beyond the traditional form of provincial
securities laws. The proposed amendments to the CBCA and regulations are for the most
part substantive requirements and are thus consistent with the traditional form of
corporate law.
55
56

Supra note 34.
Ibid.

28

Professor Poonam Puri

Applying a constitutional law analysis to the regulation of corporate governance, the
corporate governance provisions in provincial securities laws appear to go to the heart of
the central constitution or governance of federally incorporated companies. On the basis
of Multiple Access, one can make a reasonable argument that provincial corporate
governance rules should not apply to CBCA incorporated companies. The argument is
strongest for those provincial rules on corporate governance that mandate substantive
requirements (such as composition and responsibilities of audit committees) as opposed
to disclosure. While the constitutional jurisdiction of provincial securities laws to
regulate in the area of corporate governance is questionable, it is unlikely that market
participants will challenge the authority of securities commission to regulate in this area.
Market participants have been loath in the past to challenge the jurisdiction or authority
of provincial securities commissions with whom they must interact with a regular basis.
This leads us to the second stage of analysis that focuses on the mechanisms that are
appropriate to minimize costs on stakeholders if concurrent jurisdiction in respect of
corporate governance is appropriate or maintained. As a starting point, corporate and
securities law regulators should co-operate and co-ordinate and harmonize their rules,
policies and practices for the benefit of all stakeholders.
In this regard, it is particularly difficult for one regulator to respond after the other
regulator has already acted and significantly narrowed the realistic options available to
first regulator. In this regard, CBCA administrators are put in a difficult position because
provincial securities regulators have already acted to expand their scope in the area of
corporate governance, and so the options for the CBCA administrators are somewhat
constrained.
In this context, it may be a reasonable compromise to allow the provincial securities
regulators to focus on the corporate governance of distributing corporations while the
CBCA and provincial corporate law codes focus on the corporate governance
requirements for non-distributing corporations. Industry Canada’s proposed corporate
governance changes for distributing corporations that mirror, for the most part, the
reforms undertaken by securities regulators reflect a version of this compromise.
The CBCA’s proposed mandatory requirements for corporate governance (a majority of
independent directors on the board, an independent nominating committee and an
independent compensation committee) mirror the provincial securities regulators
proposed corporate governance recommended best practices, and thus do not impose
conflicting requirements on CBCA companies.
Incorporation by reference in the CBCA and/or regulations to CSA rules has been raised
in the Industry Canada paper in respect of areas including the composition and mandate
of the audit committee as well as CEO/CFO certification of financial statements.
Incorporation by reference has been discussed in detail in Part 3 of this report.
Incorporation by reference is desirable in this context because it would significantly
reduce the costs imposed on stakeholders. Incorporation by reference to the CSA rule
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would be preferable to copying the CSA rule or form into the CBCA regulations because
an amendment to the CBCA regulations would not be required if the CSA rule were
amended in the future.
C. Takeover Bids & Defensive Tactics
i.

Current Situation

Until the passage of Bill S-11 which repealed the CBCA’s takeover bid provisions, both
the CBCA and provincial securities laws contained conflicting rules in respect of the
regulation of takeovers. Prior to their repeal, the takeover bid provisions in the CBCA
were triggered when an offeror made an offer, other than an exempt offer that would
increase it’s shareholding to more than 10% of the target’s shares.57 Once the definition
of takeover was triggered, the offeror was required to distribute an offeror’s circular and
the directors were required to distribute a directors’ circular. The CBCA provisions
applied to all publicly traded companies or companies with more than 15 shareholders.
In contrast, provincial securities laws contain provisions applicable to publicly traded
companies that are triggered at a 20% threshold.58
However, both the CBCA and provincial securities laws continue to regulate defensive
tactics that can be engaged in by the target company’s management. In this regard, the
1994 Task Force on Securities Regulation noted that regulation by securities
commissions of defensive tactics in response to take-over bids is a controversial area in
respect of regulatory jurisdiction.59
The CBCA regulates this area by way of the fiduciary duty of directors to act in the best
interests of the company. Caselaw in this area has indicated that directors can engage in
defensive tactics that enhance shareholder value and that directors can also have
reasonable regard for the interests of non-shareholders.60
Dissident shareholders have on occasion approached the securities commissions to
intervene on excessive break fees, but the Ontario Securities Commission has suggested
that the courts might be the more appropriate forum in respect of allegations on break
fees. The Final Report of the Five Year Review Committee also recommended that the
OSC should not adopt a new regulatory standard in respect of break fees but only
exercise its public interest jurisdiction on a case by case factual basis.61
The OSC, however, has been more interventionist in respect of shareholder rights plans.
The OSC recently held that a shareholder rights plans adopted as a response to a
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threatened or existing hostile bid may not be valid.62 However, the OSC’s ruling may be
in contravention of the general duty imposed on directors to act in the best interests of the
corporation, which may include instituting a poison pill to contain the hostile bid and
seek alternate bids.
ii.

Analysis

The first step in the analysis is to determine whether corporate or securities law should
exclusively regulate takeover bids and defensive tactics.
Applying the shareholder versus investor test, takeover regulation is focused on providing
equal time, information and treatment to all shareholders so that they can make fully
informed decisions about whether to tender their shares. While the regulation is focused
on existing shareholders, they are deciding whether to sell their shares, which would
suggest that securities law is the more appropriate regulator and that the CBCA
appropriately withdrew from regulating the area in 2001.
Applying the substance versus disclosure test, takeover bid regulation that focuses on
adequate time and information to and equal treatment of all shareholders is appropriately
within the domain of securities law. Takeover bid regulation via securities law is focused
on disclosure and processes; it does not and should not be substantive by regulating, for
example, the price at which a takeover must take place. However, the form that securities
law rules, policies and practices on defensive tactics take result in an encroachment on
corporate law. In some instances, provincial securities law rules are effectively
substantive requirements or prohibitions (i.e. tactical shareholder rights plans are invalid),
which may conflict with corporate law duties imposed on directors to act in the best
interests of the corporation.
Applying the status and essential powers test, the takeover bid provisions in respect of
equal information, time and treatment of investors do not sterilize the operation of
federally incorporated companies; nor do they affect the central constitution or
governance of the company. One cannot reasonably make the case that provincial
takeover bid regulation should not apply to CBCA incorporated companies on the basis of
constitutional law. However, provincial securities laws in respect of defensive tactics are
more troublesome because they could fetter the discretion of directors to act in the best
interests of the corporation. As a result, there may be a reasonable argument that
provincial securities laws in respect of defensive tactics should not be applicable to
CBCA companies.
Is takeover bid regulation best enforced by public means or private means? Private
parties have certainly been strategic in deciding whether to pursue their grievances in the
courts or have the securities commissions intervene. If the equal time, information and
treatment provisions have not been adhered to while a bid is open, the provincial
securities commissions are in the best position to intervene and enforce. However, the
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issue of defensive tactics is more appropriately regulated through corporate law.
Securities regulators should be very cautious about intervening in any particular bid
where certain shareholders feel that the directors are acting inappropriately. The matter is
best left to the courts through an interpretation of the directors’ fiduciary duties.
This leads us to the second stage of analysis which focuses on the mechanisms that are
appropriate to minimize costs on stakeholders if concurrent jurisdiction is appropriate or
maintained. Given that the CBCA has already withdrawn from regulating the equal time,
information and treatment aspect of takeover bid regulation, the focus of co-operation
and co-ordination should be with respect to defensive tactics. Because the CBCA sets out
a broad standard of directors fiduciary duties, the onus is on the provincial securities
commissions to ensure that they do not overstep their boundaries to create rules or
regulatory standards that fetter the discretion of the directors to act in the best interests of
the corporation.
D. Proxy Solicitations and Exemptions
i.

Current Situation

The CBCA contains a number of specific exemptions to the definition of proxy
solicitation that are not contained in provincial securities laws. For example, the CBCA
was amended by Bill S-11 to exempt certain communications between shareholders from
the definition of proxy solicitation, including targeted solicitations to 15 or fewer
shareholders63 and solicitations by public broadcast.64
These amendments have had a laudable effect on institutional investor activism. For
example, the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, a joint effort of the largest
institutional investors in Canada to promote shareholder communications and activism,
was created shortly after the CBCA amendments.65 In addition, the Ontario Teachers’
Pension Plan recently began publicly disclosing on its website how it intends to vote its
shares at upcoming annual general meetings.66
Provincial securities laws, however, have not kept pace in respect of shareholder
communications. Provincial securities laws still contain have a broad definition of proxy
solicitation and require mandatory solicitation of proxies67 except when an investor is
soliciting proxies from 15 or fewer shareholders.68 Securities regulators are not currently
enforcing these stricter definitions.
This lack of harmony in corporate and securities laws in respect of proxy solicitation and
exemptions forces uncertainty, unfairness and unpredictability onto investors. Does the
existence of the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance violate provincial securities
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laws? Possibly. Does the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan policy of disclosing how it
intends to vote violate provincial securities laws? Possibly. Should investors comply with
the stricter securities laws, even though they are not currently being enforced? Should
they risk enforcement activity if the provincial securities regulators decide to engage in
enforcement in this area?
ii.

Analysis

The first step in the analysis is to analyze whether either corporate or securities law
should exclusively regulate proxy solicitations and exemptions.
Applying the shareholder versus investor test, proxy solicitations and exemptions relate
to shareholder communications with a goal of ensuring accountability of management.
The ability of shareholders to communicate with one another is fundamental to the
governance of the corporation, which suggests that regulation of proxy solicitations and
shareholder communications is more appropriately within the domain of the corporate
law as opposed to securities law.
Applying the substance versus disclosure test, proxy solicitation rules are both
substantive and disclosure based. The exemptions are substantive and the requirements in
respect of what is required in a proxy circular are disclosure based. On this basis, it would
appear that the substantive requirements are more appropriately regulated through
corporate law and the requirements for the disclosure through securities law.
Applying the test in Multiple Access, one could make a reasonable argument that the
proxy solicitation requirements and exemptions in provincial securities laws effectively
sterilize the operation of federally incorporated companies. Shareholder communications
are critical to governance of a company and preventing reasonable communications
negates a fundamental right of shareholders to ensure accountability of management in a
meaningful way. On the basis of constitutional law, one can make a reasonable argument
that provincial proxy solicitation rules should not apply to CBCA incorporated
companies.
This leads us to the second stage of analysis which focuses on the mechanisms that are
appropriate to minimize costs on stakeholders if concurrent jurisdiction is appropriate or
maintained. The regulators need to co-operate and co-ordinate and harmonize their rules,
policies and practices on proxy solicitations and exemptions.
Currently, Section 88(1) of the OSA recognizes that if a reporting issuer is complying
with the requirements of the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated, and the
requirements are “substantially similar,” then the requirements of Part XIX of the OSA do
not apply.69 This absolute exemption is available to issuers but not investors.
Section 88(2) of the OSA allows for the OSC to make a discretionary exemption upon
application of any interested person or company (which would include investors) if the
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OSA provisions conflict with the provisions of the issuer’s incorporating statute or “if it is
otherwise satisfied in the circumstances that there is adequate justification for doing so.”
A discretionary exemption involves a case-by-case analysis and imposes significant costs
on investors and regulators. It is not practical, reasonable or necessary for investors to
obtain discretionary exemptions every time that they wish to use a CBCA exemption to
the proxy solicitation rules.
To achieve greater harmonization in this area and reduce costs to stakeholders, provincial
securities commissions should narrow the definition of proxy solicitation and broaden the
exemptions to the requirement to distribute proxies so that provincial securities law rules
conform to the CBCA. Alternative options are to incorporate the CBCA rules by
reference, or generally recognize the CBCA rules in this area, for example, by amending
section 88(2) of the OSA so that it is automatic as opposed to discretionary.
E. Communication with Beneficial Shareholders
i. Current Situation
The CBCA allows a corporation to treat the registered owner of a security as the person
entitled to vote, receive dividends and exercise all other rights and powers of
ownership.70 However, it prohibits a registered owner from voting shares which it holds
as a nominee without seeking voting instructions from the beneficial owner.71 The
CBCA does not currently require or facilitate communication between corporations and
beneficial shareholders. In contrast, National Instrument 54-101 creates a structure to
allow reporting issuers to communicate directly with beneficial owners who have not
objected to the release of their names, addresses and securities holdings.
In analyzing the case of Fama Holdings v. Powertech Industries Inc.,72 one commentator
notes the confusion that can arise from the subtle but important differences between
registered and beneficial ownership. He writes:73
The distinction between registered and beneficial
ownership has subtle implications. The case of Fama
Holdings Ltd. V. Powertech Industries Inc. provides a good
illustration of the confusion that can arise in the
administration of proxies voted through the book-based
system. A brokerage firm held about 2.2. million shares of
the subject company’s stock, some 300,000 of which it held
directly as a registered shareholder and the balance being
held by it through two depository companies in which it
participated. The brokerage purported to vote substantially
all the shares held by it for client accounts on the basis of
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the two omnibus proxies provided by the depository
corporations, having neglected that part of the shares to be
voted were in registered form. The proxies submitted by it
were held to be valid as it was able to establish that it had
not voted more shares than it was entitled to vote directly
(the registered shares) or by proxy at the meeting.
ii. Analysis
Communication with beneficial shareholders is a pre-condition to ensuring that they can
meaningfully exercise their rights of ownership including voting and participation at
shareholders meetings. In light of the increasing proportion of shareholding through
intermediaries in Canada, the lack of a facilitative mechanism in the CBCA that allows
for communication between the corporation and beneficial shareholders results in suboptimal accountability and oversight of corporate management. On this basis, the CBCA
should be amended to (i) require registered owners to furnish corporations with a list of
beneficial owners, subject to reasonable exceptions such as in cases where beneficial
owners have requested to have their names withheld; and (ii) facilitate a process to allow
for communication between corporations and beneficial shareholders.
Similar to the analysis above on proxy solicitations and exemptions, the issue of
communication with beneficial shareholders falls better within the scope of corporate law
than securities laws. However, to the extent that National Policy 54-101 creates a
satisfactory process for addressing the relevant issues, it is recommended that the CBCA
incorporate it or adopt it by reference, which would have the benefit of minimizing costs
to stakeholders.
F. Proportionate Liability Scheme
i.

Current Situation

Both the CBCA and provincial securities laws contain proportionate liability schemes.
Bill S-11 introduced a proportionate liability scheme into the CBCA.74 Previously, all
defendants who were involved in financial preparation of information were jointly and
severally liable for any financial loss resulting from an error, omission, or misstatement
in financial information required by the CBCA. Under the old regime, the auditors of a
corporation, for example, might be liable for 100% of the loss incurred by the plaintiff
even if they were only 25% to blame. As a response to these concerns about unfairness,
the CBCA now create a framework of modified proportionate liability for claims for
financial losses arising out of an error, omission or misstatement in respect of financial
information required by the CBCA.
The scheme works as follows: A defendant or third party is generally only liable for the
portion of the loss that related to their proportionate responsibility for the loss. However,
if a plaintiff cannot collect against any particular defendant (because of insolvency, for
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example), the plaintiff can apply to court to reallocate the uncollectable amount amongst
the other defendants. The maximum that the other defendants can be additionally liable
for is 50% of their original proportionate liability. Joint and several liability continues for
fraud and for certain classes of plaintiffs, including the Crown, charitable organizations,
unsecured trade creditors, and individuals and corporations who have less than the
prescribed threshold.
Provincial securities regulators have instituted a proportionate liability scheme that
operates on different premises. For example, the OSA was recently amended to add a
statutory framework for civil liability for misrepresentations and omissions in respect of
continuous disclosure. It includes provisions on proportionate liability where each
defendant is responsible for his/her proportion of the loss.75 Defendants are responsible
for the lesser of their proportionate share of liability or the statutorily imposed liability
ceilings. For example, a reporting issuer has a liability ceiling which is the greater of 5%
of its market capitalization and $1 million, a director or officer has a liability ceiling
which is the greater of $25,000 or 50% of his/her aggregate compensation, and an expert
has a liability ceiling which is the greater of $1 million or the revenue earned from the
reporting issuer in the 12 months prior to the misrepresentation.76
ii.

Analysis

The existing situation allows for opportunistic behaviour by private parties to use or
argue in favour of the scheme that is most favourable to them. The OSA’s scheme is very
defendant friendly and focuses almost exclusively on the negative impact of liability on
defendants. The CBCA is friendlier to certain classes of plaintiffs. The CBCA’s approach
is more balanced and reflects an appreciation that certain classes of plaintiffs should not
be required to bear the risk of loss vis-à-vis certain defendants.
There is no particular policy reason to have two separate schemes operating concurrently.
The current situation imposes unnecessary costs on stakeholders by creating uncertainty
in the marketplace about rights and obligations. Effort should be made by corporate and
securities law regulators to harmonize the two liability schemes.
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5. Conclusion
Corporate and securities laws have different policy goals, jurisdictional reach and
enforcement mechanisms. On the basis of these differences, this report has surfaced
several guiding principles which can be used to support a rational allocation of
responsibility between corporate and securities laws in Canada.
The existing model of overlapping regulatory jurisdiction between the federal CBCA and
provincial securities laws provides some benefits but also imposes significant costs on
stakeholders. This report has analyzed alternatives to the current regulatory model would
preserve the mandate and policy goals of corporate and securities laws while significantly
reducing the costs to stakeholders.
Given the challenges inherent in drastic reform of the regulatory structure of corporate
and securities laws, this report focused on mechanisms to achieve better co-operation, coordination and harmonization within the current regulatory model of corporate and
securities laws, including (i) the establishment of a joint committee of corporate and
securities law administrators; (ii) Incorporation by reference to the other regulatory
framework; (iii) Exemptions or recognition based on compliance with the other
regulatory framework; and (iv) Using forms of legal instruments that allow for ease of
amendments and continued harmonization.
On the basis of the guiding principles highlighted above, this report concluded that:
Insider trading is more appropriately within the jurisdiction of securities laws as opposed
to corporate law, while corporate governance, defensive measures to takeovers, proxy
solicitations and exemptions, and communication with beneficial shareholders are more
appropriately within the jurisdiction of corporate law as opposed to securities laws. It also
concluded that there is little justification for differing proportionate liability schemes in
the CBCA and provincial securities laws.
To the extent that exclusive jurisdiction cannot be achieved, the report recommended that
regulators work to harmonize the relevant rules in each regulatory framework. The least
cost would be imposed on stakeholders if one regulatory framework incorporated the
relevant rule by reference to the other regulatory framework or if a system of recognition
or exemptions were created.
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